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Abstract. The life science domain is typified by heterogeneous data sets that are 
evolving at an exponential rate. Numerous post-genomic databases and areas of post-
genomic life science research have been established and are being actively explored. 
Whilst many of these databases are public and freely accessible, it is often the case 
that researchers have data that is not so freely available and access to this data needs 
to be strictly controlled when distributed collaborative research is undertaken. Grid 
technologies provide one mechanism by which access to and integration of federated 
data sets is possible. Combining such data access and integration technologies with 
fine grained security infrastructures facilitates the establishment of virtual 
organisations (VO). However experience has shown that the general research (non-
Grid) community are not comfortable with the Grid and its associated security 
models based upon public key infrastructures (PKIs). The Internet2 Shibboleth 
technology helps to overcome this through users only having to log in to their home 
site to gain access to resources across a VO – or in Shibboleth terminology a 
federation. In this paper we outline how we have applied the combination of Grid 
technologies, advanced security infrastructures and the Internet2 Shibboleth 
technology in several biomedical projects to provide a user-oriented model for secure 
access to and usage of Grid resources. We believe that this model may well become 
the de facto mechanism for undertaking e-Research on the Grid across numerous 
domains including the life sciences. 
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1  Introduction 
 
The life science domain is booming! The explosion of research areas, exponential growth 
of the associated data sets and the proliferation of new discoveries across and between 
disciplines is unparalleled. Building infrastructures to support such a highly volatile area 
is a fraught process [1]. As new insights and discoveries are made, existing research 
models and associated data sets have to be augmented, refined and extended to 
incorporate such new knowledge. This poses a fundamental challenge to infrastructure 
providers: how to build an infrastructure that has any form of longevity [2]? 
One thing which is clear is that scientists need to be able to collaborate with one 
another. However scientists in the post-genomic era are wary and protective of their own 
research. Collaborators in grants are also potential competitors in future funding 
proposals. Being the first scientist to make a major discovery is a strong driver for many 
leading researchers both in the present and the past. Crick and Watson and their 
identification of the double helix structure of DNA were driven by their knowledge that 
competitors such as Linus Pauling were also trying to identify this structure [3]. Similarly 
the direct financial benefits from given lines of research can pay huge dividends with 
interest from the multi-billion dollar pharmaceutical industry given the costs they incur in 
developing new drugs and evaluating their effectiveness. 
In this context scientists need to be ensured that they access and share trusted data 
from collaborators and that this is in accordance with the commonly agreed terms and 
goals of the collaboration. In the context of the Grid, such co-operations are often termed 
virtual organisations (VO). From past experiences [4] it is clear that vast amounts of the 
non-Grid community are uncomfortable with the Grid. System administrators regard it as 
a possible security threat whilst potential Grid end users are mystified and put off with the 
common security models needed to access and use a Grid. If the Grid is to ever gain the 
widespread acceptance envisaged, it needs to be as simple to use as the internet, with front 
end tools no more complex than existing browsers.  
The Shibboleth technology from the Internet2 project [5] has put forward software 
architecture [6] and associated protocols [7] for new models of security. Rather than a 
user being required to remember numerous usernames and passwords required to access 
resources across the internet, with the Shibboleth trust model, a user is able to access 
resources across a federation through signing in (authenticating) at their own local site. In 
this paper we present the Shibboleth model of security and outline how it has been applied 
across a range of biomedical projects to simplify the access and usage of Grid services 
and data. In all of this, a finer grained model of security is achievable.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide an overview of 
Shibboleth and the challenges that are needed for this technology to be accepted by the 
scientific community, especially what it means to trust. In section 3, we present various 
case studies illustrating how we have successfully combined Shibboleth. Finally in section 
4, we draw conclusions and outline plans for the future.  
 
 
2 Overview of Grid Security and Shibboleth 
 
The majority of Grid solutions today are based upon X.509 digital certificates [8] to 
support public key infrastructures (PKI) [9].  PKIs are based upon cryptographic 
technology where public and private keys are used to digitally sign (encrypt) and decrypt 
messages and information. Messages encrypted with a public key can only be read by an 
individual who possesses the associated private key. Through this mechanism, a given 
user can direct a message to a known destination, knowing that it can’t be read by anyone 
else, simply by encrypting it using the public key of that destination. The owner of the 
private key can encrypt messages with that key, and the receiver of the message can be 
sure that it was sent by the owner of the private key. Both public key agreement and 
public key transport need to know who the remote public key belongs to, i.e. who has 
associated private key. The public key certificate is the mechanism used for connecting 
the public key to the user with the corresponding private key. Public key certificates 
include a Distinguished Name (DN) which can be used for identifying a given user. The 
establishment of the identity of a given user (or machine) within a public key certificate is 
ultimately based upon trust, or more precisely trust by a community of one or more 
Certificate Authorities (CAs).  
A CA is a root of trust which holders of public and private keys agree upon. CAs 
have numerous responsibilities including issuing of certificates, issuing Certificate 
Revocation Lists (CRL) and they need to have well documented processes and practices 
which must be followed to ensure identity management. Various PKI architectures are 
possible and the selection of which depends upon numerous factors. Whether numerous 
CAs are to be trusted? How important to be able to add new CAs? What kind of trust 
relationships exist between CAs? The simplest PKI involves a single CA which is trusted 
by all users. With this model, users only accept certificates and certificate revocation lists 
issued by this CA. This model makes certificate path analysis easy since there is a single 
step from a certificate to the CA who issued it. One danger of this PKI infrastructure is 
that the CA is single point of failure. Thus if it is compromised, then potentially all 
certificates that have been issued are compromised, requiring all users to be contacted and 
certificates revoked. The ramifications of such a compromise would be catastrophic with 
potentially all resources that had been accessed using certificates issued by this CA having 
to be completely reinstalled (in case backdoor software solutions had been installed). 
Perhaps more of an issue would be the level of trust and how Grids using PKIs were 
perceived by the wider community. 
Other more complex PKI architectures also exist. For example, users may keep a lost 
of trusted CAs. However, issues such as how to tell trustworthy one from untrustworthy 
one arise? Hierarchical PKIs where there are chains of trust between the CA, sub-ordinate 
CAs and users may also exist. This model allows limiting the damage caused by a 
compromised subordinate CAs. Thus if a subordinate CA is compromised then only the 
certificates issued by them (or their subordinate CAs) need to be revoked. Other more 
complex architectures exist again, such as meshes of PKIs where trust relationships (webs 
of trust) are established on a peer-peer basis. This model often requires bridging solutions 
[10,11] between CAs and results in certificate paths that are harder to establish – 
potentially containing loops.  
The PKI architecture chosen for UK e-Science is based on a statically defined 
centralised CA with direct single hierarchy to users. The typical scenario for getting a 
certificate is as follows. Researchers wishing to gain access to Grid resources such as the 
NGS (www.ngs.ac.uk) in the first instance have to acquire a UK e-Science X.509 
certificate issued by the centralised Certification Authority (CA) at Rutherford Appleton 
Laboratory (RAL) (www.grid-support.ac.uk/ca). They will thus apply for a certificate via 
the Grid Support web site (www.grid-support.ac.uk). The CA will then contact their local 
Registration Authority (RA) – hopefully at their institution!, who will in turn contact the 
user and request some form of photographic identification (such as a passport photo or 
university card). Once the identity of the user has been ratified, the RA contacts the CA 
who subsequently informs the user (via email) that their certificate is available for 
download. The user downloads the certificate and associated certificate revocation lists 
into their browser. Once in their browser they are required to export it to forms 
appropriate to the Grid middleware. Certificates can be acquired for both users and 
servers/machines. 
The main benefit and reason for the widespread acceptance of PKIs within the Grid 
community is their support for single-sign on. Since all Grid sites in the UK trust the 
central CA at RAL, a user in possession of an X.509 certificate issued by RAL can send 
jobs to all sites, or rather to all sites where a user has requested and been granted access to 
those sites. Typically with Globus based solutions [12], gatekeepers are used to ensure 
that signed Grid requests are valid, i.e. from known collaborators. When this is so, i.e. the 
DN of the requestor is in a locally stored and managed grid-mapfile, then the user is 
typically given access to the locally set up account as defined in the grid-mapfile.  
For the existing Grid community, PKIs are a widely accepted and common model for 
how to support a basic level of security (authentication). The problem is however that the 
existing Grid community are only a small fraction of the wider e-Science and e-Research 
community more generally, e.g., in the UK ~3500 UK e-Science X.509 certificates have 
been issued by RAL, but there are over 3 million academics across higher and further 
education colleges in the UK registered to use the Athens authentication infrastructure. 
Thus it could be claimed with some justification that the Grid has only touched the tip of 
the iceberg in terms of the wider research community.  
There are many possible reasons for this as identified in [4]. These include the 
learning curve in accessing and using Grids. Most scientists do not want to gain access to 
a user account on a HPC resource but want instead to access a service which performs 
some function, e.g. BLAST in the case of the bioinformatics community. Why should a 
biologist go on a training course on Grid technology when all they require is access to a 
BLAST service on a free national HPC resource for example? Furthermore, the initial 
hurdles that have to be overcome in getting “on the Grid” in terms of acquiring and using 
an X.509 certificate are non-trivial for less IT-oriented researchers. For example, users are 
expected to convert the certificate from their CA which they initially install in their 
browser into appropriate formats understandable by Grid middleware. This requires them 
to run obscure openssl commands, and since openSSL is not commonly available on 
platforms such as Windows they are then often required to install and configure additional 
software. In some circumstances this is also not possible, e.g. if they do not have 
sufficient privileges on their PC (root access etc). In this case the researchers will instead 
have to refer to a local system administrator to help with the installation and 
configuration. 
Assuming researchers have managed to obtain a certificate which they have 
converted into the appropriate format, they are then expected to remember necessarily 
strong passwords for their private keys with the recommendation to use upper and lower 
case alphanumeric characters. The temptation to write down such passwords is obvious 
and an immediate potential security weakness.  
This whole process does not lend itself to the wider research community which the e-
Science and Grid community needs to reach out to and engage with. It is a well known 
adage that the customer is always right. Usability and addressing researcher requirements 
is crucial to the uptake and success of Grid technology. End user scientists require 
software which simplifies their daily research and not make this more complex. Given the 
fact that the initial user experience of the Grid currently begins with application for an e-
Science certificate, this needs to be made as simple as possible, or potentially removed 
completely.  
PKIs support authentication, however it is clear that the vast majority of researchers 
require much finer grained security infrastructures which support authorisation. Not just 
establishing the identity of a given user at a resource, but in defining and enforcing how 
they might access and use a given resource, or if sufficient information is not given, 
rejecting the request and subsequently logging the information. As a concrete example, it 
will never be the case that someone is allowed to access a UK National Health Service 
(NHS) resource to run arbitrary code. It may however be possible for a user to access a 
given resource to read a given anonymised database provided they have been given the 
privileges to do so in advance. 
Despite these limitations, single sign-on is a compelling model and any refinements, 
extensions or new solutions for Grid security must provide similar capabilities. Such 
models should also be targeted to, and at the complete discretion of the resource provider 
to provide site autonomy. The Internet2 Shibboleth technology provides one way in which 
many of these issues can be resolved. 
Shibboleth introduces several concepts which are fundamental to access and use Grid 
resources. These include an Identity Provider (IdP), a Service Provider (SP) and 
optionally a Where Are You From Service (WAYF). The basic scenario by which these 
components interwork is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
  
Figure 1: Basic Shibboleth Interactions for Accessing a Resource 
 
When a user attempts to access a Shibboleth protected service or Service Provider 
(SP) more generally, they are typically redirected to a WAYF server that asks the user to 
pick their home Identity Provider (IdP) from a list of known and trusted sites. The service 
provider site has a pre-established trust relationship with each home site, and trusts the 
home site to authenticate its users properly. In the UK a single federation is planned [13]. 
Other international federations have also been put forward and established [14-17]. 
After the user has picked their home site, their browser is redirected to their site’s 
authentication server, e.g. an LDAP repository, and the user is invited to log in. After 
successful authentication, the home site redirects the user back to the SP and the message 
carries a digitally signed SAML [18] authentication assertion message from the home site, 
asserting that the user has been successfully authenticated (or not!) by a particular means 
using an authentication mechanism specific to the IdP. Assuming the digital signature on 
the SAML authentication assertion is verified and the user has successfully authenticated 
themselves at their home site, then the SP has a temporary pseudonym for the user (the 
handle), the location of the attribute authority at the IdP site and the service provider URL 
that the user was previously trying to access. The resource site then returns the handle to 
the IdP’s attribute authority in a SAML attribute query message and is returned a signed 
SAML attribute assertion message.  
In Shibboleth a trust model exists in that the target site trusts the IdP to manage each 
user’s attributes correctly, in whatever way it wishes. So the returned SAML attribute 
assertion message, digitally signed by the origin, provides proof to the target that the 
authenticated user does have these attributes.  
This security model offers several direct benefits over PKIs for dynamic 
establishment of VOs in that users are no longer trusted to manage their X509 certificates 
and remember complex passwords. Instead institutions within a federation have a degree 
of trust with one another. Sites/IdPs and SPs are still autonomous and are able to decide 
for themselves whether the provided attributes are sufficient for access to the resources 
and which attributes they are prepared to release to which SP. Another key benefit of 
Shibboleth for VO establishment and management is that users are only required to 
remember their own usernames and passwords at their home institutions.  
Provided a common understanding of the roles and security attributes across the sites 
comprising the federation exists, single sign-on can be achieved. Thus if a SP trusts a 
given site for authenticating a user requesting access to its own resource, and also an 
agreement on the attributes which are to be exchanged between the sites exists, then the 
SP can authorize/restrict access to its resources from those sites that are within the 
federation provided the necessary attributes and values are presented by the IdP.  
Within the UK federation, a small set of security attributes based upon a subset of the 
eduPerson specification is being adopted [19]. These attributes include 
eduPersonScopedAffiliation which indicates the user’s relationship (e.g., staff, student, 
etc.) within their home institution; eduPersonTargetedID which is needed when an SP is 
presented with an anonymous assertion only as provided by eduPersonScopedAffiliation; 
eduPersonTargetedID attribute which provides a persistent user pseudonym; 
eduPersonPrincipalName which is used where a persistent user identifier, consistent 
across different services is needed, and  eduPersonEntitlement which enables an 
institution to assert that a user satisfies an additional set of specific conditions that apply 
for access to a particular resource. A user may possess different values of the 
eduPersonEntitlement attribute relevant to different resources.  
To support single sign-on across numerous resources, session information is 
maintained. Thus a user is able to specify whether the WAYF should remember them for 
the duration of the session, for a week or not at all. In accessing subsequent Shibboleth 
protected services, the WAYF will automatically recognize which IdP the users are from 
and redirect them accordingly. 
Ensuring that an institution in a Shibboleth federation can guarantee the authenticity 
of a user when accessing a remote resource is crucial to the overall principles upon which 
Shibboleth and Shibboleth federations are based. In short, institutions in a federation 
should trust one another. It is the case however, that users at larger institutions will likely 
have numerous usernames and associated passwords that are used to access a variety of 
services. This is the case at the University of Glasgow! However activities are currently 
underway to roll out a unified user account management system based upon directory 
technology.  
The directory is the part of any service which retains the authentication data, most 
commonly a username and a password. Until now this information at Glasgow has 
primarily been closely linked to specific operating systems or infrastructures. This has 
resulted in a myriad of solutions holding a variety of authentication information across the 
university. One of the consequences of this is that the evolution of services can become 
tied to the platform which hosts the user identities, rather than the best platform for the 
job. In most cases these accounts are not necessarily the same - indeed in lots of cases 
they are very different, and often based on a combination of central and local accounts. 
Thus users are expected to keep multiple accounts and multiple passwords. Under these 
circumstances users tend to either leave the password at the value it was when they 
received it; change it to the same value as their other passwords; they have to remember 
multiple passwords, or they end up with passwords they can’t change because changing it 
in one place means changing it everywhere. With multiple accounts, across multiple 
systems with potentially multiple different administrators coordinating changes is almost 
impossible. Addressing such issues is crucial for the wide scale successful deployment 
and take-up of Shibboleth.  
The above problems are not isolated. Until recently no mechanisms existed to keep 
the various user accounts synchronised across all of the systems used. This arrangement 
meant there was a high number of redundant accounts, which has meant that it was very 
difficult to ensure all access and privileges were removed in a timely fashion. In some 
circumstances users could retain rights to data and services long after they should. This 
was possible since different representations for the same users could in principle lead to 
situations where one account could be disabled, but users could retain access to services 
and data via a second account. A key challenge is therefore to address the whole user base 
since there may be no definitive source for authentication data, but rather a collection of 
sources. 
To overcome these issues the University of Glasgow is moving to a system that offers 
a more consistent representation of staff and students across multiple systems that will 
allow: timely creation/modification and deletion of accounts; an audit trail against central 
records; a single authority for services covering the whole university; password 
synchronisation; and the implementation of a rigorous password policy. To support this, 
the university is planning: a one to one representation between each user and their 
corresponding entry in the Human Resource/Registry database – the definitive sources for 
data; an agreed standard for unique identifiers for each user account; an agreed password 
policy; an agreed definition of department/faculty codes where user accounts should 
reside. This system is based upon the Novell nSure technology 
(www.novell.com/solutions/nsure) and is currently being rolled out by University 
Services across the university. Thus for federations with the University of Glasgow we 
hope to state with some confidence that we are able to authenticate users that are members 
of the university. 
To fully understand the benefits of Shibboleth to seamlessly support access to a wider 
range of resources, both Grid-based and non-Grid based resources, we have applied it 
across a range of areas and projects and research areas. Details of how these have been 
successfully applied in the education domain are given in [20,21]. In this paper we focus 
in particular on how we have applied this technology in the life science domain. 
 
 
 
3 Case Studies Applying Shibboleth 
 
The vision of the Grid in seamlessly accessing and using a range of resources is a 
compelling one, but one that depends on supporting technologies. Single-sign on to 
resources is one of the fundamental requirements to the realisation of this vision. From the 
life science community perspective, single sign-on to a whole range of post-genomic 
resources (both computational and data resources) through to clinical and epidemiological 
data sets and services is needed.  
Several projects at the National e-Science Centre at the University of Glasgow have 
been used to explore the suitability of Shibboleth for Grid security. These include the UK 
DTI funded Biomedical Research Informatics Delivered by Grid Enabled Services 
(BRIDGES) [22] project and the MRC funded Virtual Organisations for Trials and 
Epidemiological Studies (VOTES) [23] project. We outline these projects here and 
present how Shibboleth simplifies the user experience in accessing and using the Grid. 
 
3.1 Shibboleth version of the BRIDGES Grid BLAST Service 
 
The BRIDGES project involved the National e-Science Centre at the University of 
Glasgow and Edinburgh with industrial involvement from IBM. BRIDGES successfully 
completed at the end of 2005. BRIDGES remit was to provide a Grid infrastructure to 
support the Wellcome Trust funded Cardiovascular Functional Genomics (CFG) project 
[24] who are investigating possible genetic causes of hypertension. Hypertension is one of 
the main causes of cardiovascular mortality. This consortium which involved five UK 
sites and one Dutch site pursued a strategy combining studies on rodent models of disease 
(mouse and rat) contemporaneously with studies of patients and population DNA 
collections.  
Before BRIDGES, many of the activities that the CFG scientists undertook in 
performing their research were done in a time consuming and largely non-automated 
manner. This was typified through “internet hopping” between numerous life science data 
sources. To address this, the BRIDGES project developed a security focused data Grid 
using commercial [25] and open source Grid middleware [26].  Information on the data 
Grid that was developed within BRIDGES is described in [27-29]. In undertaking their 
research the CFG scientists also required simple access to large scale HPC resources, to 
run compute intensive bioinformatics applications such as Basic Local Alignment Search 
Tool (BLAST) [30].  
To simplify the user experience in accessing and using large scale HPC resources, it 
was decided to remove digital certificates from the end user environment and replace 
them with simple username and password authentication at a central project web portal. 
The model assumed throughout the lifetime of BRIDGES was that the end users would 
only have a web browser through which they would access and use the Grid resources. 
Given that sites such as the UK National Grid Service require a UK e-Science certificate 
for a given jobs (following the grid-mapfile approach described previously), the 
BRIDGES BLAST service host identity was mapped locally to a project account in the 
local grid-mapfile on the remote Grid nodes. Thus, all jobs run under the project’s identity 
on the NGS resources, and the logging and monitoring of user activity was maintained by 
the BRIDGES support staff.  
BRIDGES supported a fine grained security infrastructure based upon the Privilege and 
Role Management Infrastructure Validation Standard (PERMIS) (www.permis.org), 
whereby distinctions between different privileged and non-privileged users were defined 
and subsequently enforced. These were: 
• If they are unknown users the job will only be submitted to the local “free” 
Condor pool;  
• If we recognise the users but they do not have a local account on HPC resources 
at Glasgow, the job will be submitted to the Condor pool and NGS;  
• If we recognise the users and they have an account Glasgow HPC resources then 
the job will be to the Condor pool, the NGS and to ScotGrid.  
In all of these scenarios, the selection of where to submit jobs was based on availability 
of resources (which was established dynamically).  
The Shibboleth version of the Grid BLAST service did not require users to log in to the 
project portal. Instead when users directed their browsers to the project portal for the first 
time, i.e. when no security context had been established, they were automatically 
redirected to the WAYF service as depicted in Figure 2. They would then select their own 
institution from those that were listed. In this case a user might select the University of 
Glasgow for example as shown. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: WAYF Used to Select a Home Identity Provider 
 
Once redirected to their home IdP, which at Glasgow was a local LDAP server, users 
would log-in with their own usernames and passwords. Once authenticated, the attributes 
that were returned to the SP were used to enforce subsequent authorisation decisions by 
the service. We note that whilst BRIDGES VO specific attributes could be defined and 
returned, the DN of the user from the IdP was sufficient to allow an authorisation decision 
to be made. Once successfully signed in the front end to the Grid BLAST service is 
accessible as shown on the left of in Figure 3. This provides access to a range of genomic 
and microbial data resources which can be BLAST’ed against. The service supports 
protein and nucleotide sequence searches and allows upload of input sequences or 
cut/paste of sequences in FASTA format. To support large scale BLAST’ing users can 
select options to be emailed the results when the jobs are completed, or they can 
interactively see the status of the jobs across the various Grid resources (whether they are 
queued, completed, running) shown in the right of Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Grid BLAST front end 
 
We note that this model of applying Shibboleth where the user identity (given by the 
DN) is returned and subsequently used to make authorisation decisions, raises issues in 
the application of Shibboleth. Shibboleth has been developed to support user 
anonymisation and privacy in accessing and using resources across a federation. However, 
with the Grid model, knowing which user is accessing a resource, especially in the 
biomedical domain is crucial. We also note that whilst Shibboleth supports user 
anonymisation and privacy it is not mandatory and free text strings containing information 
such as the DN of the user from an IdP to an SP can be returned. The policies on what 
information and attributes an SP can ask for and what information an IdP is prepared to 
release will form part of the overall federation contract. There is no obligation on an IdP 
releasing potentially sensitive information about a given user.  However if an SP requests 
certain attributes to be returned for example which the IdP refuses to release then the SP is 
completely free to refuse to grant access to their own resource. SP autonomy is thus 
assured. 
As stated, the primary benefit of the Shibboleth enabled version of the BRIDGES Grid 
BLAST service is that the user no longer needs to remember a username and password for 
a given portal. Instead they only need to know their username and password at their home 
site. Whilst only needing to know a single username and password is a key benefit in 
applying Shibboleth, the true benefits arise when the user wishes to access a multitude of 
different resources across many sites, as is typically the case in supporting systems-
biology based research from the genotype to the phenotype and population studies, i.e. 
supporting single sign-on across a range of resources and sites. Whilst BRIDGES was 
targeted to the genetic end of the spectrum, the VOTES project was targeted towards the 
other extreme and was focused on clinical trials and epidemiological studies.   
 
3.2 Shibboleth version of the VOTES Data Federation Framework 
 
The VOTES project was funded by the MRC for 3-years and began in October 2005. The 
project involves the universities of Glasgow, Oxford, Imperial College London, 
Nottingham, Leicester and Manchester. The overall goal of VOTES is to develop a Grid 
framework through which a multitude of clinical trials and epidemiological studies can be 
supported. Thus rather than engineering bespoke solutions for a given trial or study, 
VOTES intends to provide an infrastructure where a multitude of trials and studies can be 
developed and supported, each with their own particular nuances in terms of the data that 
is being accessed, the security policies that apply etc. 
At the heart of clinical trials are three key processes: patient recruitment; data 
collection and study management. Recruitment is primarily concerned with identifying the 
patients that are potentially suitable for a clinical trial. Once identified it is essential that 
they are advised about all matters related with the clinical trial: the benefits, the potential 
dangers and more widely how this information might be used in the future. One of the 
challenges of this is that it is essential that patient consent is obtained before any access to 
the patient data sets is made. Once a set of patients have been identified, invited to join the 
trial and accepted, the next phase is typically focused on that actual undertaking of the 
trial itself. This will be in collecting data on the patients throughout the course of the trial. 
If the trial is concerned with drug evaluation say, then it is necessary to randomize the 
patients with some patients being given the drugs to be evaluated and others a placebo. 
Tracking and monitoring the patients throughout the trial is essential to ensure that all 
necessary information is collected, e.g. that the patients always visited the doctor or 
hospital and took the drug or placebo. When this is not the case, the results need to 
incorporate any discrepancies between the planned and actual trial plan since this may 
well impact upon overall evaluation of the drugs. 
Throughout the recruitment and data collection process it is essential that the study or 
trial is conducted according to a strictly defined protocol. This will focus on what 
information is being collected, for what purpose and how it will subsequently be used 
both within and following the trial. A key element of this is ensuring that the different 
people with different roles within the trial can only access and use the different data sets 
and services associated with their particular role in the trial. 
The Grid infrastructure developed within VOTES has been described in [31-33]. In 
brief, the VOTES infrastructure is based upon a GridSphere portal (www.gridsphere.org) 
which provides access to a range of Globus toolkit version 4 services, which themselves 
access and use a data federation framework utilising OGSA-DAI technology. The current 
implementation combines the access to and usage of a range of software and data sets in 
widespread use across the NHS in Scotland.  
The project has defined and implemented a fine grained authorisation infrastructure 
based upon an access matrix. In this model, very fine grained security is achievable that 
allows a clinical trials co-ordinator to define access to and usage of individual tables, rows 
and columns across the range of distributed clinical data sets and attach these with trials 
specific roles.  
At the time of writing, the infrastructure supports a range of clinical trials to allow 
exploration of the problem space. Each of these trials has associated specific roles that 
have been defined. These include investigator, consultant and nurse. We note that whilst 
there are over 180 different roles in the NHS in the Greater Glasgow region alone, clinical 
trials will typically not require such a detailed range of roles and privileges.  
The Shibboleth version of this infrastructure follows a similar access and usage 
pattern as described above in section 3.1 for BRIDGES. Namely, that the user attempts to 
access the VOTES portal and is initially redirected to the WAYF service where they 
select their home IdP. We note that when a user has signed in already, e.g. they have 
authenticated themselves to access the BRIDGES portal, provided the user is using the 
same browser, they will in principle, automatically be allowed access to the VOTES 
portal. Here the term in principle depends on whether the attributes necessary for access 
to the VOTES portal were already released to the BRIDGES portal. In Figure 4 the portlet 
is shown which details the attributes that are returned from the IdP. As can be seen one of 
the roles is investigator (the other roles are used for a different demonstration in the 
education domain). The common name (CN) is also returned (CN=Richard Sinnott) along 
with information on the Shibboleth origin (another name for the IdP). 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Authenticated User Attributes Delivered via Shibboleth to the VOTES Portal 
 
Based upon this authentication information and the attributes returned, the portal will 
ensure that the authenticated user is restricted to seeing the trials and associated data 
associated with their particular role (privilege). Figure 5 shows the impact of the different 
roles and attributes that are returned from the IdP. On the left an authenticated user with a 
more privileged role (investigator) is able to issue richer queries across a range of 
resources. This includes allowing the user with this particular role to see identifying data, 
i.e. the patient name and address. An authenticated user with a nurse on the other hand is 
only able to issue queries returning non-identifying data.  
  
Figure 5: VOTES Data Framework targeted to Different Roles 
 
4 Conclusions and Acknowledgements 
 
The life scientists interesting in tackling the big questions like how does a brain work, 
why do people who eat less tend to live longer, what genes cause cancer, etc cannot work 
in isolation. They need to access and use a wide range of information much of which may 
well have very fine grained security associated with it. The Grid provides an infrastructure 
whereby heterogeneous, highly distributed data sets can be accessed and integrated. A 
simple user oriented model of security is essential that should be cognisant of existing 
security infrastructures and policies, e.g. how local authentication is supported. Shibboleth 
provides for many direct advantages in this domain: it supports single sign-on to a 
widespread range of resources across a federation; it recognises and respects local security 
infrastructures policies and procedures; it supports users only having to know their own 
local institutional usernames and passwords; it allows for very fine grained authorisation 
infrastructures to be supported based on returned attribute sets. 
Shibboleth on its own offers a largely static mechanism whereby the roles and 
attributes needed to access resources have to be defined and agreed in advance. Whilst for 
the non-Grid community where the only authorisation information needed is often of the 
form, is a member of the University of Glasgow say, this model does not support the more 
dynamic Grid environment where new virtual organisations need to be created 
dynamically for evolving Grid environments requiring richer attribute sets are needed 
specific to the different roles across a given Grid project say. The DyVOSE project [34] 
has implemented a delegation issuing service [35] which supports precisely this kind of 
scenario. Our next plans are to consider how this service can be applied in this domain for 
dynamic attribute creation and recognition across clinical domain boundaries. 
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